A universal logic might be universal as a paraconsistent logic, i.e. in all fields in which we need a paraconsistent logic (like a semantically closed language, needed to speak about meaning in complete generality) this logic can be employed and gives acceptable results. This may be called the weak universalist program. One may take the weak universalist program as being extremely cautious: One takes one' s favoured paraconsistent logic -and sticks to it in all contexts (i.e. applies its inference rules in consistent as well as in inconsistent contexts). Since this paraconsistent logic can deal with contradictory contexts it is universally applicable. The problem with this extreme caution is that one loses all otherwise available inferences in consistent contexts. Therefore one may try to distinguish the type of context one is reasoning in. In praxis this means that we employ standard First Order Logic for all non-semantic or non-antinomic contexts and switch to paraconsistency only in our formalization of complete semantics or, maybe, set theory.
A truly universal logic can be employed everywhere, supposedly containing a way to distinguish within itself consistent from inconsistent contexts, without loss of proper logical power in comparison to First Order Logic. This may be called the strong universalist program. In case philosophy contains consistent contexts and uses arguments valid only in consistent contexts it seems to need to follow a strong universalist program. Universalism is universalistic about logical form as rendered by a formalization using universal logic.
Both the LFI-approach in paraconsistent logic (cf. Carnielli et al. 2004) and Adaptive Logics (cf. Batens 2000) follow the idea to be able to distinguish within the system used contexts of a stronger logic and contexts for a paraconsistent logic. The way they achieve this is completely different, however. In the LFI-approach the distinction what kind of context we have has to be given beforehand; only given the corresponding knowledge can we choose the appropriate formalization. In Adaptive Logics we 'mark' the supposition that some formula has to be consistent, a supposition that may be revised in the process of reasoning; no prior knowledge about the consistency behaviour of a context is required. Some rules like Disjunctive Syllogism and ex contradictione quodlibet have to be restricted. They are only used if the on the left hand side of their application no contradiction is involved. Without adaptivity we had to reason using some paraconsistent logic in all contexts which we suppose to contain contradictions. Given that quite a lot of standard logic is missing [including contraposition, transitivity (of identity) etc.] that is a severe restriction. We cannot capture a lot of (harmless) consequences in that field then. Adaptivity, on the other hand, makes clear that reasoning from present contradictions is rather the exception than the rule.
The proponents of the corresponding camps within paraconsistency (like Diderik Batens) are, however, outspoken logical particularists, i.e. they propose that one chooses a logic given a particular task or topic at hand.
An advanced proposal for a universal logic made by a supporter of logical universalism is (Brady 2006) . Universalism in logic thus has become an explicit topic. Some philosophical arguments for universalism may be found in (Bremer 2008 Whether universal logic as understood in §1 is incompatible with logical pluralism depends, of course, on what logical pluralism is taken to assert.
• If pluralism just means that there are several logical systems, and one may use some specific system for some specific purpose this is compatible with the claim that there is the logic of universal discourse.
Many logics may be used where appropriate, and their mere existence has no deeper philosophical impact than the observation that given a specific purpose at hand one may abstract from a lot of things (as in treating the acceleration of a falling object we are not interested what materials make up its weight).
• There just is a set of truth functional options in the vicinity of standard negation. One may even take negation to be not truth functional. Deciding to call one of these functions "negation" and using "¬" to represent it, does not change negation, it, at most, changes the meaning of a symbol.
There is no 'truth by convention' in the sense that merely stipulating some axioms makes the involved symbols true of the world; badly chosen axioms these may not be true of the world, or at least not in the intended sense. So one cannot change negation by fiat. What negation really is, on the other hand, may be a tough question. Maybe one of the non-standard connectives comes closer to negation. The whole discussion about negation, however, presupposes that there is some central function these different logics try to pin down. Rejecting the Quinean objection against 'deviant logics' as just 'changing the topic' therefore works not in favour of logical pluralism.
• If pluralism means that there cannot be a unique system of universal logic, this -apart from needing argument -seems to be a version of relativism (and fares no better than relativism fares with respect to any other scientific field). One understanding of Carnap's slogan 'to plan languages' and his 'principle of tolerance' may see Carnap as advocating complete instrumentalism and relativism with respect to linguistic frameworks (cf. Carnap 1933) . Extreme conventionalism, however, fails in fixing the set of (proper) logical truths: If a semantic idealist (claiming that truth can be generated by convention) believes that any convention can do, he is subject to the famous "tonk"-counterexample of absurd rules for introducing and eliminating logical connectives. An "or"-like introduction rule with an "and"-like elimination-rule yields "A∧¬A" even for consistent statements A. Non-logical truth -at least in part related to the idea of correspondence -is not generated by convention either. Extreme conventionalism or extreme logical pluralism as a version of semantic idealism is incompatible with even mild versions of realism. §3
Comments on some Proposals of Pluralism
The arguments for logical pluralism rejected in §2 are very weak. They serve merely as dummies. The real world proponents of logical pluralism have a stronger position in mind.
J.C. Beall, Greg Restall (2000 , Gert-Jan Lokhorst (1998) and Achille Varzi (2002) have defended their version(s) of logical pluralism. Beall and Restall (2000) define being a pluralist about logical consequences as 'you need only hold that there is more than "one true logic"'. Pluralism in this sense is clearly compatible with universalism and having logics for specific fields or tasks. Saying that there are 'equally good logics' amounts to no more than saying that there are equally good tools, but a hammer and a spade being both good tools, does not make the hammer fit for digging. Their second definition of pluralism says 'you can hold that two different logics L and L' are both accurate and systematic accounts of (different specialisations of) the one notion of logical consequence'. Is this pluralism in a relevant sense? Of course there may be partial representations of x both focussing on some specific aspect, but this does not make them incompatible as long as one does not take a partial description for a complete one. (This is true also in the case of empirical descriptions: Even if there are more comprehensive
[scientific] descriptions available it is -at that level of description -not wrong to say that the cat is on the mat.) This does not rule out that there is one and only one accurate comprehensive description, and with respect to logic it does not rule out that there is one and only one best representation of logical consequence in general. As logics are used to reconstruct arguments the principle of shallow analysis demands that we bring to light no more logical structure than is needed to give the argument a form in which it is valid (i.e. in case of a successful reconstruction of a correct argument). Since not every time an argument is valid its validity depends on its form in modal logic we may abstract from modal logical form in these cases, but this does not make the option to give a more complete formalization into a case of logical pluralism in any interesting sense. An interesting case of logical pluralism would only be given if with respect to the same concepts (like quantification or modalities) different proposals are presented for the logic of such a given specific concept.
Beall and Restall seem even to acknowledge this in case of the many modal logics, about which they say that 'once you are specific about what your logic is meant to do, there is scope for genuine disagreement'. That is true if the two systems are proposed as comprehensive renderings of the area of logic in question. The disagreement may not be so easy to resolve in general logic as it is in some highly constrained area of applied logic, but as there may be only one true comprehensive description of the world, there may be only one comprehensive universal logic. However our logical faculties work and how difficult it turns out to capture them in a formal specification, they are 'just there', and one (universal) logical system is the way of representing them, whether we get to know it or not.
Later Restall (2002) is not a shared frame which is able to put the two natural language reasoning systems into correspondence it is refuted by being a version of the incommensurability thesis. If this just meant that some people may use a system that corresponds to a subsystem of the system that some other people use, this is again no interesting case for pluralism just as incomplete knowledge is no argument for (epistemic) relativism. That one may construct strange formal systems that are incompatible with some basic tautologies (like A ⊃ A) shows no more than that one may construct strange theories about the world that are incompatible with some basic assumptions about our universe (e.g. that the universe is extended). To claim that some people (i.e. people like humans we know living on a planet like ours) may use such a logic is not really conceivable, just as no engineer can work on the premise that the universe is not extended in space.
So it seems that logical pluralism of these kinds is either a version of relativistic semantic idealism or it is only an appeal to the fruitfulness of a division of labour in logic research. The latter is a helpful attitude to stop Further on, logical pluralism is formulated in some language. This language has to be well-defined to make logical pluralism a well-defined, non-vague thesis. Logical pluralism has to be true (simpliciter). The theory language of logical pluralism (the language used as a metalanguage when talking about the different ways to spell out being logical) has a logical form. Whatever else may be vague in a language, a sentence has at a given level of specification (say Categorical Grammar vs.
Propositional Temporal Logic) one and only one most articulate logical form. Even in case a surface structure has more than one derivation, and thus is related to more than one logical form, the logical forms themselves do not leave the logical structure unspecified and algorithmic procedures relate a surface structure to a logical form. At the most comprehensive level (the level which takes all structural elements into account) there is one complex logical form. Given the possession of logical form, some particles/words may be singled out as 'logical vocabulary'. These logical words have their respective syntactic behaviour and meaning constitutive rules (truth conditions). Thus the theory language of logical pluralism provides us with a logic, namely the logic that goes with its logical vocabulary. Translating the theory into some other language will not change this, since the translation has to preserve truth conditions, at least. One may wonder what (evolutionary) explanation might be given for this.
Linguists of the transformational camp (and some others as well) claim that we have a highly specified innately fixed module for language acquisition, which comes with principles the parameters of which are the only elements left to be settled by regional languages (cf. Chomsky 2005). Apart from sentences too long to parse there are possibly only some very contrived complex sentences beyond the fixed apparatus of our language (faculty). With respect to our ordinary talking and thinking there is no unsettled part of our grammatical assessment of sentences. Why should logic have come apart from language? This is even more questionable since language employs a 'level' or 'phase' of logical form in processing mental representations and at the interfaces to other mental modules. This level or phase of logical form (LF) is highly constrained by both internal constraints of syntax (like Government) and external constraints of semantics (like providing the structure for employing the quantificational truth conditions).
[LF] structure must be articulated so that both logical structure -that needed to explicate the direct role of the syncategoremic logical terms -and compositional structure -that needed to explicate the indirect role of the categoremic non-logical terms -is represented. (May 1993, p.336) .
There is overwhelming empirical evidence for this level of structured descriptions (cf. Chomsky 1995).
Of course, the theory of LF has been criticized and some have claimed The main aim of this paper has been to put forth questions to the logical pluralists. So it may be too early to rush to a conclusion. On the other hand, it seems, that the case for logical pluralism is far from clear. It is even unclear what exactly logical pluralism is and where is stops. It is even unclear if logical pluralism could be stated as it is if it was true. So far universalism seems to be the better position to take.
